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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of perfectly secure
communication on a modified version of Wyner’s wiretap channel
II where both the main and wiretapper’s channels have some
erasures. A secret message is to be encoded into n channel
symbols and transmitted. The main channel is such that the
legitimate receiver receives the transmitted codeword with exactly
n− ν erasures, where the positions of the erasures are random.
Additionally, an eavesdropper (wire-tapper) is able to observe the
transmitted codeword with n − µ erasures in a similar fashion.
This paper studies the maximum achievable information rate
with perfect secrecy on this channel and gives a coding scheme
using nested codes that achieves the secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wire-tap channel was introduced by Wyner [1], where
a transmitter (Alice) wants to convey a secret message to
a legitimate receiver (Bob) through a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC). The message must be kept secret from an
eavesdropper (Eve) who has a degraded version of the legiti-
mate receiver’s observation. Wyner has studied the information
rates at which complete secrecy is possible in this system.
This work was furthered by that of Csiszar and Korner [2],
who generalized the secrecy concept to general wire-tap chan-
nels, where the two receivers have noisy observations of the
same channel transmission. They have studied the maximum
possible secret information rate for this generalized wire-tap
channel.
The wire-tap channel II was studied in [3], where the
transmission length is fixed to n. Alice must convey a k
symbol message to Bob by transmitting n symbols over the
channel. Bob receives these symbols without noise and Eve
can observe a fixed number, µ, of the transmitted symbols.
Ozarow and Wyner provided a stochastic coding scheme based
on cosets of linear codes for this channel. This scheme ensured
successful decoding by Bob while Eve is kept completely
ignorant as long as a good linear code is chosen and µ is
not too large.
In this paper, we study a modified version of wire-tap
channel II where the main channel can also have a fixed
number of erasures, n − ν. In other words, Bob can observe
any ν of the n channel symbols, and Eve can observe any µ
of the channel symbols. Alice must devise a coding scheme
that guarantees successful decoding by Bob while Eve can
obtain no information about the message. We prove that the
maximum amount of secret information that can be conveyed
in this channel is ν−µ, assuming ν ≥ µ. We then show how a
nested coding scheme ([4]) can be used to achieve the secrecy
capacity.
A simple solution to combat erasures on the main channel
is to use the existing Ozarow-Wyner coding scheme [3]
(described shortly) , with an outer code for error correction.
We propose a coding scheme based on Ozarow-Wyner’s coset
coding which is equivalent to adding an outer code. We use
two codes C,C∗ that have only the zero codeword as the
common element. We encode the secret message using C and
encode a random vector with C∗, and transmit the sum of the
two resultant codewords. This formulation is easier to analyze
compared to the cascaded encoder formulation since the inner
and outer codes are combined into a single encoder. Also,
it can be noted that when C + C∗ and C∗ are MDS codes,
then the information rate equals the secrecy capacity of this
channel. When ν−µ = 1, this coding scheme with MDS codes
becomes identical to the coding scheme used by Shamir [5]
for the (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
To study the performance of our coding technique, we use
the Dimension-Length Profile (DLP) property of linear block
codes. The basic idea behind the DLP and its relation to wire-
tap channels was first published by Wei [6]. The DLP property
and its related LDP property were rigorously defined and
studied by Forney [7]. Mitrpant, et al. [8] studied the secrecy
capacity of wiretap channel II under a special case where some
of the information bits are revealed. Their analysis uses the
DLP properties of linear block codes and their expressions for
secrecy capacity are similar to those in our paper.
A practical example of this modified wire-tap channel II
problem is in distributed storage depicted in figure 1. A user
wants to store a secret information in n data nodes. These data
nodes are susceptible to random failure. We want to design a
system that can reconstruct the secret data from any ν of the
storage nodes. In addition, some of these storage nodes can
also be read by an adversary (eavesdropper). The adversary
can access only a limited number of these storage nodes (due
to time, memory, geography or other constraints). The user
wishes to store information in such a way that the adversary
can obtain absolutely no information about the secret message
even if he can read any µ of the storage nodes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section II we
formally state our problem and give an overview of our
notation. In the section III, we state the Ozarow-Wyner so-
lution for the wire-tap channel II and perform an analysis
using dimension/length profile (DLP) of linear block codes.
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Fig. 1. Secure distributed storage system with an eavesdropper
In section IV we present a way to use nested codes, i.e. a
set of two codes where one of the codes is a subcode of the
other, on our modified wire-tap channel II and analyze the
performance using the DLP of the underlying codes.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FORMULATION
Let F be a finite field of size q. All the vectors in this
discussion will be drawn from vector spaces on F and the
logarithms are taken to the base q. The channel under consid-
eration is depicted in fig. 2. Alice has a uniformly distributed
k-symbol random message S that must be conveyed to Bob by
transmitting a n-symbol vector X over the channel. The main
channel is such that a fixed number, n−ν, of erasures occur in
Bob’s received codeword, Y . The positions of these erasures
are randomly chosen. In addition, there is an eavesdropper
who has the ability to tap into any µ of the n transmitted
symbols. Alice knows the values of ν and µ. She does not
know anything else about the erasures on the main channel
or the symbols being tapped by Eve. Her task is to choose
an encoding scheme which ensures that Bob can completely
decode the message while Eve has complete equivocation over
the message in spite of knowing the encoding procedure and
the µ symbols revealed to her. A special case of the above
problem when ν = n is the case considered by Ozarow-Wyner
[3].
First, we define some notation for the analysis of conditional
entropy under erasure. Let I = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} be the index
set for the elements in an n-symbol vector. Let J ⊆ I be the
index set of the revealed positions. Given a vector X ∈ Fn, by
XJ , we denote the vector in F|J| which is formed by taking
the elements of X indexed by the elements of the set J . In
particular, note that (XJ , J) completely describes the result of
erasing the symbols of X in positions I\J .
Let M ⊂ I,W ⊂ I be the index set of the revealed symbols
of the main channel and the wire-tapper’s channel respectively.
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Fig. 2. Wiretap Channel II with erasures on the main channel
Our objective is to devise a coding scheme such that,
H(S|XM ) = 0, ∀M ⊂ I, |M | = ν (1)
H(S|XW ) = H(S), ∀W ⊂ I, |W | = µ (2)
where all the entropies are computed using base-q logarithms.
The above conditions can be met only if µ ≤ ν − k. This is
because the following necessary conditions must hold.
1) for µ ≥ ν, and M ⊂W , X → XW → XM is a Markov
chain and by data processing inequality
H(S|XM ) ≥ H(S|XW )
Hence, conditions (1) and (2) don’t hold for this case.
2) for µ ≤ ν and W ⊂M , we have the following necessary
condition for achieving (1) and (2)
k = H(S|XW )−H(S|XM )
= H(S|XW )−H(S|XW , XM\W )
= I(S;XM\W |XW )
≤ H(XM\W |XW )
≤ H(XM\W )
≤ ν − µ
III. OZAROW-WYNER CODING FOR WIRE-TAP II
In Ozarow-Wyner coding for the wire-tap channel II with a
perfect main channel, a (n, n− k) linear code C∗ is chosen.
This code has qk cosets and we can construct an arbitrary
bijection between the set of all cosets and the set of all possible
k-symbol messages. For a given message S, Alice chooses
a random vector from the corresponding coset with uniform
probability and transmits it.
Since the main channel is perfect and the encoding is done
such that any given n-tuple maps to a unique message, the
decoding across the main channel is error-free. So, we have
H(S|Y ) = H(S|X) = 0
Since X is uniformly distributed in Fn, we have qn−|W |
possible values (balls) for X with equal likelihood given Eve’s
observation XW . If we bin these values based on their cosets,
the non-empty bins correspond to the possible messages with
non-zero probability. The a-posteriori probability of a message
is equal to the fraction of balls present in the corresponding
bin. It can be shown that the non-empty bins will have the
same cardinality, which means that the possible messages are
all equally likely.
In the following, we cast the results of [3] and [6] in
terms of the above balls and bins approach and then analyse
the conditional entropy of the secret message using DLP
properties. This gives a slightly different interpretation of the
problem of coset coding with erasures, which is later used
again in the next section to analyze the performance of coset
coding on the modified wiretap II channel with erasures on
the main channel.
A. Coset binning
Let a ∈ Fn be a match for XW in the symbol positions W .
Let c be any codeword in C∗ with cW = 0. Clearly, c + a
is also a match for the observation. Let C∗
I\W , {c : c ∈
C∗, cW = 0}. It can be seen that C∗I\W is a subcode of C∗.
The set a+C∗
I\W is the set of all possible matches for XW in
the coset to which a belongs. Hence, the number of balls in a
non-empty bin is |C∗I\W |. qn−|W | balls distributed in such a
fashion will result in qn−|W |/|C∗I\W | non-empty bins. Hence,
H(S|XW ) = n− |W | − dim(C
∗
I\W ) (3)
For complete secrecy, we must achieve (2) or equivalently
min{H(S|XW ) :W ⊂ I, |W | = µ} = k
⇒ min{n− |W | − dim(C∗I\W ) :W ⊂ I, |W | = µ} = k
⇒ n− µ−max{dim(C∗I\W ) :W ⊂ I, |W | = µ} = k
⇒ n− µ− kn−µ(C
∗) = k
Here, ki(C∗) denotes the ith dimension/length profile
(DLP) of the linear code C∗. For a detailed discussion on
DLP, see [7].
IV. NESTED CODES
In this section, we consider the case of the modified wiretap
II channel where Bob gets only ν of the n symbols in
Alice’s transmitted codeword and Eve gets µ of the codeword
symbols. We propose and analyze a coding scheme for this
channel. We then show that if the codes are MDS, then the
coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity of this channel.
Let C be an (n, k) code and C∗ be an (n, k∗) code, with
0 ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ k∗ ≤ n − k. Also assume that
C ∩ C∗ = {0} and D = C + C∗. Let G and G∗ be the
generator matrices of the codes C,C∗ respectively. Let S be
the uniformly distributed k symbol secret message, and E be a
uniformly distributed random vector of length k∗. We transmit
X = SG + EG∗ and we try to analyze the case when we
reveal only a certain number of symbols from X . Note that
when k∗ = n − k, this nested coding scheme is the same as
the Ozarow-Wyner scheme for Wire-tap II.
The set of valid values of X can be binned into qk distinct
cosets of C∗. Every such coset of C∗ maps to a distinct
message in Fk. Let J ⊂ I be the index set of the revealed
symbols. Given the observation XJ , we use the binning
approach in the previous section to find the wire-tapper’s
equivocation. Given XJ , the number of possible solutions for
μ ν
ν – μ
Fig. 3. Amount of leaked information vs. number of revealed symbols for
the case of nested MDS codes
X is |DI\J |. The size of the non-empty bins is the same as
in the previous section. We have,
H(S|XJ) = dim(DI\J)− dim(C
∗
I\J ) (4)
To satisfy the conditions in (1) and (2), we must have
dim(DI\M )− dim(C
∗
I\M ) = 0 ∀M ⊂ I, |M | = ν
dim(DI\W )− dim(C
∗
I\W ) = k ∀W ⊂ I, |W | = µ
A. Using nested MDS codes
For a (n, k) maximum distance separable (MDS) code C˜,
we have
dim(C˜I\J ) = max{0, k − |J |} (5)
Hence, if we choose the codes D and C∗ to be nested MDS
codes, we will have
dim(DI\J)− dim(C
∗
I\J ) (6)
= max{0, k + k∗ − |J |} −max{0, k∗ − |J |} (7)
=


0, |J | ≥ k + k∗
k + k∗ − |J |, k∗ ≤ |J | < k + k∗
k, 0 ≤ |J | < k∗
(8)
A sketch of the plot of the above function vs. |J | is shown in
fig 3 for the case when k = ν − µ, k∗ = µ.
Suppose there is a situation where n, µ, ν are specified and
we are free to choose the symbol alphabet F. From the analysis
in the previous section, we can achieve the maximum possible
secret information rate by choosing F to be a field of size not
less than n and construct two nested Reed-Solomon codes
D,C∗ of dimensions ν, µ respectively. We then have,
dim(DI\M )− dim(C
∗
I\M ) = 0, ∀M ⊂ I, |M | = ν
(9)
dim(DI\W )− dim(C
∗
I\W ) = ν − µ, ∀W ⊂ I, |W | = µ
(10)
In this case, we have a coding scheme that achieves the
maximum possible secret information rate. Table I illustrates
how to choose nested MDS codes for the erasure-erasure
wiretap channel.
Channel parameters n = 255, ν = 200, µ = 150
Secrecy capacity 50
255
≈ 0.196
Code D (255, 200) RS code over F256. Generator
polynomial g(x) = (x − α)(x − α2)(x −
α3) · · · (x− α55)
Code C∗ (255, 150) RS code over F256. Generator
polynomial g(x) = (x − α)(x − α2)(x −
α3) · · · (x− α105)
TABLE I
NESTED MDS CODING SCHEME EXAMPLE
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the erasure-erasure wiretap
channel model where the numbers of erasures are fixed but the
positions of the erasures are chosen at random. We have shown
that a coding scheme based on nested MDS codes achieves the
secrecy capacity of this channel. We have assumed that the
channel model permits us to choose the finite field over which
we draw the symbols. Analyzing the secret information rate
of general (non-MDS) nested codes over a similar channel is
a natural generalization of our problem. This will also lead us
to design secure coding schemes for a much wider choice of
channels.
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